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Unresolved Issues in  Monetary 
Policy  by Anthony M.  Solomon 
It is an honor and a pleasure to join the distinguished 
list of speakers who have appeared here in the George 
Eccies lecture series. The pleasure has to be espe- 
cially pointed for a Federal  Reserve  official since 
George's brother, Marriner, was, of course, one of the 
great figures in our central banking history. 
I want  to talk today on the interrelated topics of infla- 
tion and the strategy of monetary policy  in dealing with 
it. By the beginning of this decade,  inflation  had 
reached its highest peacetime level in American expe- 
rience. This represented the culmination of an irregular 
upward  movement of some 15 years' standing.  The 
main task of monetary policy over the past four years 
or so has been to bring this inflation under control. 
Monetary policy has had no significant help from other 
types of policy in this fight. The climate has not been 
right for any type of incomes policy. And fiscal policy 
has not, to say the least, been of much help either! 
George  S. Eccies Distinguished  Lecture, Utah State University, 
Logan, Utah, April 12, 1984. 
We have nevertheless had a major success on the 
inflation front. As of 1983, most measures of prices and 
wages suggested that 15 years of acceleration  have 
been reversed. Inflation last year was pushed back to 
the lowest levels since the mid-1960s. There has of 
course  been some step-up from the extremely  low 
rates prevailing right around the trough of the reces- 
sion. This was inevitable. And some further accelera- 
tion is likely this year. Nevertheless,  the basic situation 
is far better than it has been for a long time. 
To be sure, the cost of this success, in the form of a 
deep recession, has  been  heavy.  But that price has 
been paid and is behind us. We are obviously having a 
very good economic expansion and I think the  pros- 
pects for its continuation are also good.  Indeed, the 
principal worry at this point is that it may not have set- 
tled down yet to a sustainable rate. 
In the meanwhile, the highly volatile interest  rate 
environment that prevailed while inflation was being 
brought down seems to have disappeared over the last 
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I year and a half. Interest rates have of course fluctu- 
ated, rising most recently. But the range of variation 
day to day, week to week, and quarter  to quarter has 
been much narrower in the past year and a half than it 
was from late 1979 to late 1982. 
Of course people worry as much about the average 
level of interest rates as about their volatility. And there 
is no denying that interest rates remain high in longer 
historical perspective.  There are still some people, 
probably a minority by now, who lay the blame for high 
interest rates at the door of monetary policy. This com- 
plaint  is unjustified. For one thing, despite the progress 
on inflation, the inflation premium in long-term rates 
remains exceptionally high. Some of the available evi- 
dence suggests that the long-term  inflation expectations 
of financial market participants may be still as high as 6I4 
percent as they look out over the next several years. 
These kinds of inflationary expectations are of course 
reflected in the yields on long-term  debt instruments. 
The skepticism that markets show about the future 
prospects for price stability reflects mainly two things. 
The first is our whole checkered history on inflation. 
The markets wonder if the inflationary experience we 
have had doesn't point to a basic weakness of modern 
industrial democracies in coping with this problem. But 
skepticism about our ability to deal with inflation has 
been greatly intensified by our problems with the fed- 
eral budget. The level of anxiety about the deficit and 
its longer run  implications for inflation has clearly 
heated up again in the markets this year. The fears of 
future inflation that are  holding up interest rates  will 
only come down, I am convinced, in the face of pro- 
tracted experience  with actual low inflation and with 
clear signs that the budget has come under control. 
Obviously everybody would prefer a world with lower 
federal deficits and lower interest rates.  But some 
seem to be suggesting that we can get  the lower inter- 
est rates and their attendant  blessings without pro- 
gress on the fiscal front. The "solution" they seem to 
be proposing  is much faster growth  in  money engi- 
neered by a more expansionary monetary policy. In my 
view, such an  approach would be nothing  short of 
calamitous. Such a policy would  represent precisely 
the  combination of budgetary disorder  and monetary 
complicity that has produced most of the world's clas- 
sic examples of runaway inflation. Instead, the solution 
to high interest rates has to come from the fiscal side. 
For monetary policy to abandon the approach that has 
made possible our progress  on  inflation would be a 
very sad mistake after all we have been through in the 
last few years. 
Monetary  targets and financial change 
But while we can take satisfaction in the results of p01- 
icy in calming inflation, the conceptual and  strategic 
underpinnings of monetary policy have to some degree 
become less clear over the past two or three years. By 
the mid- to late 1970s, protracted experience with infla- 
tion had convinced the Federal Reserve  and other  cen- 
tral banks that we needed to find a way to refocus 
attention  on the primary,  indeed  the only  possible, 
longer run objective of central banks: stability in the 
value of money. 
The result of  the search for a new approach here and 
abroad was something new in central banking practice: 
annual  growth  rate targets for monetary  and credit 
aggregates. The reasons for turning to this approach 
are straightforward. Thus it was clear when monetary 
targeting was first introduced  — as it remains clear now 
—that control of inflation requires, as a necessary con- 
dition, slowing in money growth. There may be, and 
certainly are, many underlying causes for inflation. And 
there are many kinds of policies that may help in its 
control. But restoration of money growth rates to levels 
consistent with the economy's longer run capacity to 
produce is the essential monetary condition for reason- 
able price stability. Moreover, when the monetary tar- 
geting approach was adopted,  there was  a general 
belief that a reasonably stable relationship existed, at 
least over the intermediate  to longer run, between 
money growth and nominal aggregate demand. So the 
long-run  strategy was framed  in  terms of seeking 
steady but fairly gradual reduction in money growth 
rates to bring nominal demand into line with our real 
capacity to produce. 
While inflation has indeed been brought down, the 
events of the last two or three years have somewhat 
undermined confidence in this formulation of monetary 
strategy.  And indeed, actual monetary behavior has not 
been altogether  consistent  with it.  The year-to-year 
path of monetary growth has not always followed the 
script of steady but gradual decline. 
Implementation problems aside, the basic reasons 
for deliberate  departure from this strategy are well- 
known. At root, they basically reflect the wave of finan- 
cial innovation and deregulation affecting the markets 
for money and near money instruments we have been 
experiencing. Innovation and deregulation have been 
significantly changing the character of the money mea- 
sures. The narrow money  measure  (Ml) has been 
affected by the spread of NOW accounts, by the intro- 
duction of Super NOWs,  and by other developments. 
The broad money measures, M2 and M3, have been 
radically transformed by the spread of the money mar- 
ket funds and by the virtually complete deregulation of 
time deposit interest rates  that has proceeded  in 
stages over the last several years. 
The result of these developments has been changed 
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economy. One obvious sign of this change was the 
unusual weakness of  velocity, especially of Ml velocity, 
during the recession and early recovery periods. The 
velocity of Ml showed an unusually sharp decline dur- 
ing the recession and a delayed and unusually weak 
rise during the early quarters of recovery. 
Another sign of change is the much  weakened 
response of the broader money measures to changes 
in interest rates. Over much of the postwar period, the 
cyclical  performance of these measures was deeply 
affected by  the rise and fall of interest rates above and 
below regulation-imposed  ceilings on time deposit 
rates.  Growth in the broader aggregates  would  be 
slowed sharply when market rates rose above the ceil- 
ing rates and  would  accelerate  sharply when rates 
once again fell below these ceilings. These so-called 
"disintermediation" and "reintermediation" phenomena, 
once such a dominant feature of broad money growth 
patterns, have largely disappeared. Consequently, the 
recent behavior of  these money measures has been far 
different from what would have been expected in the 
past under similar interest rate conditions. 
Now it is possible that the departures from past 
norms in the behavior of the various money measures 
are purely transitional. In that case, we might expect a 
return to past patterns once the recent institutional 
changes have been fully absorbed. I think  this is hardly 
likely in the case of the broader money measures, and 
I am skeptical even in the case of Ml. But even if only 
a transition period is involved, it may be a long one. 
For one thing, further interest rate deregulation is due 
— under current law for regular NOW and  savings 
accounts,  and under proposed  regulation, even for 
demand deposits. And just as important, it may take 
substantial experience with the new money measures 
as they evolve to get a firm sense of what  has become 
"normal" once the transition has been completed. 
So in continuing to use the framework of monetary 
targeting, we in the  Federal Reserve have labored— 
and are laboring — under some difficulty. At the level of 
monetary strategy we have responded to these prob- 
lems over the past year and one-half with some mod- 
ifications in the settings of  our target ranges,  with some 
adjustments in the base periods to which the growth 
rate targets refer, and with some shifts in the relative 
importance attached to the various money measures. 
Moreover, in 1983 we added a monitoring range for a 
broad credit measure to the ranges for the money mea- 
sures we target. 
At the level of  tactics, we have also made some mod- 
ifications in  our operating procedures. Thus the pro- 
cedures adopted in October 1979 provided for some 
automatic response of interest rates to short-run move- 
ments in the money measures, especially in Ml, when 
these measures seemed to be deviating from their tar- 
get paths.  Under this approach, above-path  money 
growth would automatically result in upward pressures 
on short-term rates. Similarly, below-path growth would 
tend to result in some easing of rates. The aim was of 
course to quickly set countervailing pressures in 
motion whenever money growth strayed from p.ath. Not 
surprisingly, this approach added to short-run interest 
rate volatility. And with the apparent loosening of the 
relationship  between the money  measures and the 
economy in  1982, automatic responses to short-run 
movements  in  these measures no longer seemed 
appropriate. Consequently, since late 1982 we  have 
been using a day-to-day approach that neither targets 
interest rates directly—as we did before October 1979 
—nor causes them to respond automatically to short- 
run movements in money. 
Alternative monetary policy frameworks 
But despite the various modifications we have made, 
both  in the targets themselves and in our tactical 
approach to hitting them, we have retained the basic 
framework of monetary target ranges in formulating our 
monetary strategy. The basic appeal of this approach 
remains. It is just as true now as it was when this 
approach was introduced that we need a procedure for 
focusing attention  — both our own and the public's  — on 
the long-run objective of reasonable price stability. And 
it is just as  true now as before that price stability  in the 
long run requires slowing money growth to rates com- 
patible with our real growth potential. The problem is 
that the recent changes in the character of the money 
measures have increased the difficulties of translating 
this approach  into concrete numerical  ranges. The 
increased uncertainty about the economic results that 
can be expected from any given rate of money growth 
means that we shall continue to have to respond flexi- 
bly to emerging changes in the behavior of the money 
measures. And as we gain further experience,  we may 
want to change the menu of measures we target or 
further adjust the weight  we  give to the different 
measures. 
In particular, some have  advocated that we give 
major weight not to any of the money measures, but to 
a broad measure of credit. The broad credit measures 
clearly have some advantages. They are pretty  much 
immune to the recent innovation  and  deregulation 
problems that have affected the money measures. And 
their statistical  relationship to GNP seems to be hot 
demonstrably inferior to that of the money measures. 
Moreover, movements  in the growth of the broad credit 
measures appear to be less volatile than that of the 
money measures. So this is a proposal that deserves 
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But the drawback of the broad credit measures is 
that they are little more directly controllable  by the 
main instruments of monetary policy than is GNP itself. 
Indeed, they can be thought of as basically a some- 
what imperfect proxy for nominal aggregate demand. 
So perhaps we need to confront the issue of nominal 
GNP targets for monetary policy  head on.  This  is a 
concept that has been attracting increasing attention 
lately, and not just in this country. Interestingly,  it is an 
idea that gets a lot of support from academics and 
from some journalists and  congressmen. But in my 
experience, the response of central bankers, both here 
and abroad, tends to be less than enthusiastic. 
The  conceptual case for nominal GNP targets is easy 
enough to state. Monetary policy seeks over the longer 
run to provide reasonably stable nominal values. And 
nominal  GNP, as a measure of nominal  aggregate 
demand, has a more powerful  and direct impact on 
nominal values generally than any of the intermediate 
financial  measures, whether of money or credit.  You 
don't have to worry about the velocity problem  with 
nominal GNP targets, or about such related matters as 
innovation and deregulation in financial markets.  And at 
least at a conceptual level, you could frame a long-run 
anti-inflationary strategy in terms of gradually declining 
growth in nominal GNP, ultimately to a rate in line with 
long-run real growth trends. 
But the problems with nominal GNP are just as clear. 
The first is that the central  bank cannot deliver on a 
GNP target. To be sure, it cannot deliver in any very 
direct way on some of the money and credit measures 
either—especially the broader ones. But the order of 
magnitude and nature of the control problem is differ- 
ent with respect to GNP. The financial magnitudes are 
at least determined in markets where  central  bank 
instruments impinge directly. GNP outcomes of course 
depend on  policy levers not under the control of the 
central  bank—most notably on fiscal  policy—as  well 
as on many things outside of policy  control. Central 
bankers, understandably, do not want to be held to 
objectives on which they can't deliver. 
But perhaps  even  more fundamentally,  under  our 
system of central bank independence, it is simply not 
appropriate for the Federal Reserve to set broad eco- 
nomic goals. That is the task of elected officials. The 
anomaly involved in the Federal Reserve setting broad 
goals for the economy would become even more pain- 
fully obvious if GNP targeting were to further  evolve 
toward  setting separate  objectives for the price and 
real output components of GNP—and I am afraid such 
an evolution would be hard to resist. 
However this latter problem were resolved, the ten- 
dency to set GNP goals chronically too high would be 
very strong. Nobody would want to set forth a set of 
figures as a target that said, in effect: "If we don't get 
restraint on inflation, we're going to aim for subnormal 
or  even negative real growth." And yet history suggests 
there may well be times when this kind of tough stance 
will be needed. 
Finally, I think GNP targeting would risk the loss of 
longer run objectives in a futile chasing of short-term 
goals. We have to remember  that monetary policy oper- 
ates on GNP only with a lag. And these lags may be, 
as Milton Friedman has argued, "long and variable." If 
this quarter's GNP growth is below its target path, the 
temptation would  be to push on the gas pedal hard 
enough to get quick and visible results. In fact, the out- 
come is likely to be overshooting and instability. 
So to me, it is far better for our central bank to seek 
a general financial environment compatible with long- 
run objectives for financial and monetary stability than 
to be loaded down with the impossible task of seeking 
to hit specific economic outcomes on a year-by-year 
basis. 
Of course this doesn't mean we don't have to keep 
an eye on the actual performance of the economy as 
we go about our business. The need for explicit atten- 
tion to ongoing developments  in the economy is exactly 
the lesson taught by our recent problems with velocity. 
But I believe formal GNP targets—whether determined 
by the Federal Reserve itself or imposed on it by the 
Congress  —  could ultimately undermine the institutional 
conditions in which an overall climate of monetary sta- 
bility is possible. 
Let me be a bit more specific about what I think we 
have to do in the circumstances in which we find our- 
selves. First, we should continue to set and use money 
and credit target ranges, but only with a willingness to 
make  adjustments in them whenever  we  see our 
expectations about their "normal" behavior going awry. 
Obviously  I am  no fan of making the policy levers 
respond automatically to short-run developments  in the 
aggregates.  But longer run  deviations from target, 
when the targets themselves continue to seem valid, 
clearly do require a response. 
Second, interest rates are obviously very important, 
both operationally and in the way we think about our 
impact on the economy. But even granting the prob- 
lems with the monetary aggregates, interest rate  objec- 
tives are just no way to structure monetary policy. We 
simply don't know at all what interest rates will prove to 
be appropriate under given circumstances. The recent 
ability of the economy to rebound vigorously  while 
rates have remained historically high is clear evidence 
of this. 
Third, the one place where interest rates may help us 
in formulating long-run monetary strategy is, I think, in 
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should normally be above the current inflation rate. In 
other words, real short-term rates should be positive. 
When they are not, as was often the case in the 1970s, 
the result is almost certainly going to be  inflationary 
since credit demands are sure to explode. On the other 
side, however, I do not think we can state an appropri- 
ate upper bound for real interest rates. In normal times, 
with a budget that is in rough balance, historical expe- 
rience may be a reasonably good guide.  But under pres- 
ent conditions, it almost certainly  is not. 
Fourth, as I have already said, I do not think formal 
GNP targets are helpful, but I do think  we have to keep 
our eyes on the economy.  Indeed, under current condi- 
tions, the performance of the  economy has to be a 
matter of first-rank importance. Experience has shown 
us that we can't have enough confidence in the aggre- 
gates to focus  on them alone, blind to all other 
considerations. 
Finally—and on this I may depart from some of my 
colleagues  — I think we have to pay more attention to 
the international implications of domestic monetary pol- 
icy. We are only beginning to grasp in this country the 
implications of the foreign sector—of the trade and 
exchange  rates—for our domestic real growth,  our 
financial  markets, and  our inflation performance.  In 
other countries, the trade and exchange rate implica- 
tions of any and all monetary policy decisions are likely 
to get prime  attention.  In this country,  international 
considerations have most of the time  been put in a 
separate compartment labeled "exchange market inter- 
vention." We can't afford this kind of thinking anymore. 
Domestic  monetary  policy has a far  more powerful 
influence on exchange  rates  and the international 
economy generally than does exchange rate interven- 
tion when its potential money supply effects are ster- 
ilized. This is certainly true at the present  highly 
restricted scale of intervention, and it may well be true 
at any practical level of intervention. 
Inflation prospects and antI-Inflation polIcIes 
Overall, the approach to monetary  strategy we take 
should provide the needed degree of longer run disci- 
pline. Money and credit targets can continue to fill that 
role, as long as appropriate allowance is made for their 
changing characteristics when and as these emerge. 
More generally, I think  there is an increasing and unfor- 
tunate tendency to think  that the problem of creating a 
reasonably noninflationary world is mainly a problem of 
devising the right kind of monetary strategy. The propo- 
nents of monetary rules —  whether of strict monetary 
targeting or of some mechanical response to changes 
in the price of gold or of some commodity price index 
— seem  to  think  our problems with  inflation 
are mainly technical. They are not. They are rooted in 
major structural features of our modern world,  both 
economic and political. These features tend to make 
policies that will ultimately prove inflationary attractive 
in the short run. On the other side, inflation,  once 
begun, is very expensive to bring under control—as 
we have certainly seen. 
A basic feature of our economy is that most prices 
and wages respond only sluggishly to changing 
demand conditions. So when monetary policy is used 
to slow aggregate demand, the main initial response is 
not slower prices and wages, but reduced output and 
employment. The improvement on prices comes only 
later, and only after real  activity has been slowed. 
Under these conditions, slowing inflation always 
imposes a cost,  temporary but sometimes heavy.  Much 
of the public  discussion  of the inflation problem, at 
least until fairly recently, gave proper emphasis  to  ways 
of changing the economic structure to reduce the cost 
of using aggregate demand policies to contain inflation. 
Some ideas on how to do this have been around for 
a long time—and are no less valid for that reason. 
Some involve removing government impediments  to the 
ability of prices to respond  promptly to restraint on 
aggregate demand. Others seek to improve the func- 
tioning of the labor market so that wages also respond 
more flexibly and so that we can operate the economy 
at lower unemployment rates without risking inflation- 
ary pressures. We have made a little progress on some 
of these things. Rate deregulation in some industries is 
an example. But there would have to be a large number 
of such changes to produce a really  significant 
improvement in the performance of our pricing mecha- 
nism.  And  implementation  of these changes  often 
involves disturbing vested interests. So it is sometimes 
easy to get discouraged about the feasibility of imple- 
menting enough of these  ideas to have a significant 
impact. 
Other ideas for reducing the cost of keeping inflation 
under  control are newer: One such idea is the  suggestion 
that wage inflation could be made less impervious to 
demand restraint if multiyear wage contracts that lock 
in  past high  inflation rates were eliminated. Another 
idea would tie wage increases more directly to demand 
conditions by having some part of them take the form 
of profit sharing. These ideas definitely deserve a hear- 
ing.  They offer the prospect that aggregate demand 
policy could slow wage inflation with much less impact 
on employment than it has now.  A number of recent 
wage agreements have in fact incorporated some ele- 
ment of profit sharing. But at the level of public policy, 
the climate doesn't seem  at all conducive at the 
moment to a major  reexamination of our wage and 
price  practices. Perhaps that will continue to be the 
— 
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good control. 
As I suggested earlier, some acceleration of inflation 
during economic recovery from recession lows is inevi- 
table. The problem during the  late  1960s and  1970s 
was that each inflation peak was higher than the one 
before  it.  Our task  is to reverse that overall trend. 
When we do take the longer view, there is clearly one 
large negative in the prospects for further progress on 
inflation over the next few years, the federal deficit. 
And make no mistake about it, this is going to be a 
very serious negative  indeed if the problem is  not 
addressed vigorously and promptly. 
But the deficit aside, there may also be some good 
things going for us on the longer run inflation outlook. 
Demographics, plus the fact that much of the absorp- 
tion of women into the labor force is behind us, means 
that we will have a more experienced workforce. This 
means, in turn, that the unemployment rate at which 
inflation tends to accelerate is likely to drop from the 
levels that have proved to cause problems in the past 
decade or so. 
Moreover, partly because of these changes in the 
characteristics of the workforce and partly for other 
reasons, we seem likely to get an improvement on the 
very  slow  productivity growth we suffered in the 1970s. 
Indeed, at least some students of  this problem think  we 
could approach the rapid growth we enjoyed for sub- 
stantial stretches earlier in the postwar  period. Any 
improvement on productivity would  help the inflation 
problem. It would permit us to run  the  economy at 
higher operating rates without risks of overheating. It 
would also help to satisfy workers' desires for rising 
living standards without the need to press for inflation- 
ary wage increases. 
Finally, it is clear that some significant fraction of the 
inflation of the 1970s reflected the two oil shocks, one 
triggered in 1973 by a  realignment of power  within the oil 
industry, the second by the Iranian Revolution in 1979. A 
little luck in avoiding repeats of such shocks would be a 
major help on the inflation front in the years ahead. 
With luck—and it will take some of that plus a reso- 
lution  of the deficit  problem—inflation, nominal GNP 
growth, and interest rates could settle down to much 
lower average levels and narrower ranges of variation 
than we have seen in recent years. If this does happen, 
the technical issues and problems of monetary policy 
that have so bedeviled us recently will seem  less 
pressing. After  all, earlier  in the postwar period, mone- 
tary policy was a relatively simple business of "leaning 
against the wind," and money and credit growth rates 
were in fact a lot lower  and more stable than they have 
been in the past 10 or 15 years. 
Not that the risks of resurging  inflation will ever 
entirely disappear. Like so many problems of the mod- 
ern world, the risk of reigniting inflation is something 
we will have to learn to live with on a year-by-year 
basis. But I am  optimistic that  our prospects are 
brighter than they have been for some time, and that is 
perhaps reason enough for satisfaction. 
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